

# Summer School: Syntax, Truth, and Paradox

Annotated bibliography

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The main reference for Lorenzo Rossi's part of the course is:

- Gallovich, C. and Rosenblatt, L. (forthcoming), 'Conceptions of Paradoxicality', to appear in Rossi, L. (ed.), *The Liar Paradox*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

The paper will be made available to the students, with the kind permission of the authors, before the Summer School starts.

The remaining items are optional – of course, we do not require participants to read all of them. The following list is designed to provide further references for those who intend to zoom into a specific topic. For those interested in the topics at hand, we recommend to read the items in each group in the order in which they are presented here.

## Selected references by topic

### General conceptions of paradoxicality and theories of semantic paradox

- Chihara, C. (1979), 'The semantic paradoxes: A diagnostic investigation', *The Philosophical Review*, 88(4), pp. 590-618.

### The inclosure conception of paradoxicality

- Priest, G. (1994), 'The Structure of the Paradoxes of Self-Reference', *Mind*, 103(409), pp. 25-34.
- Beall, J. C. (2014), 'End of Inclosure', *Mind*, 123(491), pp. 829-849.
- Smith, N. J. J. (2000), 'The Principle of Uniform Solution (of the Paradoxes of Self-Reference)', *Mind*, 109(433), pp. 117-122.

### The naive conception of paradoxicality

- Murzi J. and L. Rossi (2020), 'Generalized Revenge', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 98(1), pp. 153-177, 2020.
- Cook, R. (2011), 'The no-no paradox is a paradox', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 89(3), pp. 467-482.
- Bacon, A (2015), 'Can the Classical Logician Avoid the Revenge Paradoxes?', *The Philosophical Review*, 124(3), pp. 299-352.

### **The proof-theoretic conception of paradoxicality**

- Tennant, N. (1982), 'Proof and Paradox', *Dialectica*, 36, pp. 265-296.
- Schroeder-Heister, P. and L. Tranchini (2017), 'Ekman's Paradox', *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, 58(4), pp. 567-581.

### **The graph-theoretic conception of paradoxicality**

- Rossi, L. (2019), 'A unified theory of truth and paradox', *The Review of Symbolic Logic*, 12(2), pp. 209-254.
- Schindler T. and T. Beringer (2017), 'A Graph-Theoretic Analysis of the Semantic Paradoxes', *Bulletin of Symbolic Logic*, 23, pp. 442-492.

### **The revision-theoretic conception of paradoxicality**

- Gupta, A. (1982), 'Truth and Paradox', *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 11(1), pp. 1-60.
- Hsiung, M. (2022), 'Designing Paradoxes: A Revision-theoretic Approach', *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 51(4), pp. 739-789.

### **The Kripkean conception of paradoxicality**

- Kripke, S. (1975), 'Outline of a theory of truth', *Journal of Philosophy* 72, pp. 690-716.
- Gallovich, C. and Rosenblatt, L. (2022), 'Paradoxicality in Kripke's Theory of Truth', *Synthese*, 200(71).
- Rosenblatt, L. (2021), 'Paradoxicality without Paradox', *Erkenntnis*, 88(3), pp. 1346-1366.

### **Further references on semantic paradox**

- Beall, J. and Murzi, J. (2013), 'Two flavors of Curry's Paradox', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 110(3), pp. 143-165.
- Curry, H. (1942), 'The inconsistency of certain formal logics', *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 7, pp. 115-7.
- McGee, V. (1985), 'How Truthlike can a Predicate be? A Negative Result', *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 14, 4, pp. 399-410.
- Montague, R. (1963), 'Syntactical treatments of modality, with corollaries on reflexion principles and finite axiomatizability', *Acta Philosophica Fennica*, 16, pp. 153-67.
- Parsons, C. (1974), 'The Liar paradox', *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 3(4), pp. 381-412.
- Shapiro, L. (2011) 'Expressibility and the Liar's Revenge', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 89(2), pp. 297-314.

### **Further references on Kripke's theory**

- Burgess, J. P. (1986), 'The Truth is Never Simple', *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 51(3), pp. 663-681.

- Cain, J. and Damnjanovic, Z. (1991), 'On the Weak Kleene Scheme in Kripke's Theory of Truth', *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 56(4), pp. 1452-1468.
- Cantini, A. (1989), 'Notes on Formal Theories of Truth', *Mathematical Logic Quarterly* 35(2), pp. 97-130
- Davis, L. H. (1979), 'An Alternate Formulation of Kripke's Theory of Truth', *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 8(1), pp. 289-296.
- Hansen, C. S. (2015), 'Supervaluation on Trees for Kripke's Theory of Truth', *The Review of Symbolic Logic*, 8, pp. 46-74.
- Feferman, S. (1984), 'Toward Useful Type-Free Theories. Part I', *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 49(1), pp. 75-111.
- Fitting, M. (1986), 'Notes on the Mathematical Aspects of Kripke's Theory of Truth', *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, 27(1), pp. 75-88.
- Kremer, M. (1988), 'Kripke and the Logic of Truth', *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 17(3), pp. 327-332.
- Martin, R. L. and Woodruff, P. (1975), 'On Representing 'True-in-L' in L', *Philosophia*, 5, pp. 213-217.

## Further resources

### SEP Entries

- Truth:  
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/>
- The Liar Paradox:  
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/>
- Curry's Paradox:  
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/curry-paradox/>
- Paradoxes and Contemporary Logic:  
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradoxes-contemporary-logic/>
- Self-Reference:  
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/>
- Axiomatic Theories of Truth:  
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-axiomatic/>
- The Revision Theory of Truth:  
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-revision/>
- Deflationism:  
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-deflationary/>
- Tarski's Definitions of Truth:  
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tarski-truth/>

## Handbooks and monographs

- Barwise, J. and Etchemendy, J. (1987), *The Liar. An Essay on Truth and Circularity*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Beall, J. (2009), *Spandrels of Truth*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Beall, J.C, Glanzberg, M. and Ripley, D. (2018), *Formal Theories of Truth*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Burgess, J. P. and Burgess, A. (2011), *Truth*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Cantini, A. (1996), *Logical Frameworks for Truth and Abstraction*, Volume 135 of Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
- Cook, R. (2014), *The Yablo Paradox. An Essay on Circularity*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Field, H. (2008), *Saving Truth from Paradox*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Gupta, A. and Belnap, N. (1993), *The Revision Theory of Truth*, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA).
- Halbach, V. (2014), *Axiomatic Theories of Truth*, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Horsten, L. (2011), *The Tarskian Turn. Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth*, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA).
- McGee, V. (1991), *Truth, Vagueness, and Paradox*, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis.
- Priest, G. (2006), *In Contradiction*, Expanded Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Scharp, K. (2013), *Replacing Truth*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Simmons, K. (2018), *Semantic Singularities. Paradoxes of Reference, Predication, and Truth*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

## Anthologies

- Achourioti, T., Galinon, H., Martínez Fernández, J., Fujimoto, K. (eds.) (2015), *Unifying the Philosophy of Truth*, Springer, Dordrecht.
- Glanzberg, M. (ed.) (2018), *The Oxford Handbook of Truth*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Nicolai C. and Stern J. (eds.) (2021), *Modes of Truth. The Unified Approach to Modality, Truth, and Paradox*, Routledge, London.