Lugano Philosophy Colloquia. Spring 2026

The Lugano Philosophy Colloquia continues on this Spring 2026!

This series of events are held on campus for philosophy students and on Zoom for everyone. To participate in these events, please write to [email protected].

The recordings will then be posted on the ISFI youtube channel.

Provisional schedule and names (the abstracts and titles of the talks will be added in due time):

(1) On Friday, February 27 at 4.30pm (CET), Room Multiuso FTL Building (USI west campus) 
Lorenzo Cocco (Warsaw University of Technology)

Do Mathematical Facts Have Physical Effects?

Abstract: Contemporary physical theories are platonistic in the modest sense that they assume the existence of sets and functions. I will argue that they are also Platonistic in a stronger sense. When they are not outright pythagorean, they posit pervasive correlations between the properties of physical systems and mathematical models. I give an argument that some of these correlations must be due to an interaction. The correspondence would be miraculous without any coordination, or some other noncausal explanation. An analogy with a version of the Access Problem due to Hartry Field will be examined.

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(2) On Thursday, March 12 at 4.30pm (CET), Room Multiuso FTL Building (USI west campus)
Thomas Sattig (University of Tuebingen and USI)

Temporal Consciousness: The Non-Locality Problem

Abstract:  The non-locality problem concerns the foundations of phenomenal consciousness. The problem consists in the tension between two aspects of human perceptual experiences. First, the local temporal horizon. In our conscious perceptual experiences, the world around us seems to evolve through brief changes on the order of milliseconds to seconds. When asked about the temporal profile of our perceptual experiences, we report that we seem to be “stuck in the present”. Second, the global temporal order. We are usually awake and conscious for minutes to hours. During long streams of consciousness, we experience all processes as having a global temporal order. According to standard order theory, a strict linear temporal order is based on a non-local relation of precedence. But this means that our consciousness lacks a local temporal horizon. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have not yet addressed this problem systematically. In this talk, the problem will be introduced by reference to a precise visual case. Then a solution to the problem will be developed. The solution will part with long-held assumptions in philosophy of time and philosophy of consciousness.

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(3) On Friday, March 20 at 4.30pm (CET), Room Multiuso FTL Building (USI west campus)
Béatrice Lienemann (University of Fribourg)

The Explanatory Role of Forms in Definitions in Plato

Abstract: The talk addresses the complex relation between Forms and definitions in Plato. A straightforward conjecture about this relation might be that to define things like justice or beauty one must refer to the corresponding Forms, i.e. the Form of Justice or the Form of Beauty. In other words, Platonic Forms fulfil the role of the definientia in a proper definition. But even if this conjecture goes in the right direction, at least in so far as the middle and later dialogues are concerned, neither did Plato present this view out of the blue in these dialogues nor has he ever unfolded it in full detail and as explicitly as one may wish. In this talk, I examine in more depth why Forms are well suited, according to Plato, to be definientia, or even to be the only appropriate definientia whatsoever. I start by asking what motivates Plato to develop an interest in definitions in the early dialogues. I submit that it is through the various unsatisfying answers offered by his interlocutors that Plato’s Socrates first develops a substantial conception of the conditions that must be met by a satisfactory definition. This reveals also the need for the explanatory priority of the definiens in good definitions and paves the way for asking why and to what extent, according to Plato, only Forms turn out to be suited to fulfil this explanatory role in definitions.

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(4) On Wednesday, May 6 (new date) at 5.00pm (CET), Room Multiuso FTL Building (USI west campus)
Damiano Costa (FTL-USI)

The instant of change and metaphysical indeterminacy

Abstract: In this paper, I apply Wilson’s account of metaphysical indeterminacy to explore an indeterminacy solution to the puzzle of the instant of change.

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(5) On Monday, May 11 at 5.00pm (CET), Room Multiuso FTL Building (USI west campus)
Lorenzo Lorenzetti (USI)

A Relational General Relativistic A-theory

Abstract: It is often assumed that relativistic physics leaves no room for an A-theory of time. Special relativity seems to rule out a privileged present, while general relativity appears to undermine any physically meaningful notion of change, given diffeomorphism symmetry. We argue that this conclusion is premature. We develop a general-relativistic A-theory that avoids ad hoc privileged structure, whether local or global, and respects the symmetry structure of general relativity. Drawing on the framework of relational observables, we defend a gauge-invariant, frame-relative notion of change grounded in physical reference clocks rather than external time. We then argue that, when combined with suitably refined versions of Fine’s external relativism and fragmentalism, this yields a genuinely A-theoretic account of objective becoming. The result is a non-standard A-theory that preserves irreducible tense while remaining fully compatible with general relativity. (based on joint work with Nicola Bamonti).

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(6) On Thursday, May 21 at 5.00pm (CET), Room Multiuso FTL Building (USI west campus)
Giovanni Valente (Politecnico di Milano)

Approximations that matter: virtual particles as carriers of interactions

Abstract: In this talk, based on joint work with Nicolò Cangiotti and Gianni Arioli, I will develop an indispensability argument in support of the existence of virtual particles in scattering processes. In order to avoid the Paradox of Infinite Limits, which allegedly poses a challenge to scientific realism, one needs to de-idealize the fictitious systems introduced by the two limiting procedures employed in the perturbation scheme, namely the infinite expansion in Dyson series and the limits for negative and positive infinite times associated with the assumption of free particles. I will show that these limits do not introduce essential idealizations, in agreement with scientific realism. What is more, according to our argument, unobservable virtual particles arise as essential approximations and they should be interpreted as propagators of the interaction responsible for subatomic scattering. As such, their existence is based on the use of approximations that matter.

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If you want to stay updated on our incoming events, please visit this webpage, or subscribe to our mailing list.

For any question, please don't hesitate to write to [email protected].

Organisers:
Institute of Philosophy (ISFI)
The SNSF funded projects:
Temporal Existence,
Equivalence in Metaphysics